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Abstract 
A diagnostic process is an investigative process that takes a 
clinical picture as input and outputs a diagnosis. We propose a 
method for distinguishing diagnoses that are warranted from 
those that are not, based on the cognitive processes of which 
they are the outputs. Processes designed and vetted to reliably 
produce correct diagnoses will output what we shall call 
‘warranted diagnoses’. The latter are diagnoses that should be 
trusted even if they later turn out to have been wrong. Our work 
is based on the recently developed Cognitive Process Ontology 
and further develops the Ontology of General Medical Science. 
It also has applications in fields such as intelligence, forensics, 
and predictive maintenance, all of which rely on vetted 
processes designed to secure the reliability of their outputs.  
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Introduction 
Hogan and Ceusters (1) define a diagnostic process as follows: 
[DP1] Diagnostic Process =def. An interpretive process that has 
as inputs 1) a clinical picture of a given patient, 2) an aggregate 
of representations of 2a) at least one type of disease and 2b) at 
least one type of phenotype whose instances are associated with 
instances of that disease, and has as output 3) an assertion to the 
effect that the patient has a disease of a certain type. 
[DP1] was proposed as a means of excluding from the realm of 
diagnoses those cases where a clinician (or fortune-teller) 
arrives at what we might outwardly think of as a diagnosis 
though what is in fact a lucky guess or a matter of mere hearsay 
– f.i.merely reading about a diagnosis and agreeing with it.
[DP1] rules out such cases because lucky guesses, hearsay, and 
so forth are products of processes that rely on sources of 
information unrelated to the formulation of a diagnosis, for 
instance horoscopes or rumors. More specifically, such cases 
are not produced by processes that input: 1) a representation of 
phenotypes that are clinically abnormal (called a ‘clinical 
picture’), 2a) an aggregate of representations of at least one type 
of disease and 2b) at least one type of phenotype whose 
instances are associated with instances of that disease.  
When taken in conjunction with the further definitions provided 
in Table 3., [DP1] allows us to rule out lucky guesses and 
hearsay on the part of non-clinicians from counting as 
diagnoses. But they are only the first step in addressing luck in 
medical diagnoses. A goal of medicine is to develop processes 
that reliably produce diagnoses that can be trusted. While a 
trusted – or trustworthy – diagnosis may in fact be incorrect, it 
is still reasonable and appropriate to assume at the time when it 
is produced that it is correct. Two types of diagnoses therefore 
need to be distinguished, namely: those that were, and those that 
were not the output of a process that was successfully designed 
or vetted to reliably produce correct diagnoses. [DP1] does not 
yet draw this distinction.  
The aim of this paper is threefold. It is, first, to revise [DP1] by 
expanding what counts as an output, and thereby further 
refining the definition of diagnosis. Second, to incorporate the 
Cognitive Process Ontology (CPO) (2), an extension of the 
Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) (3), into our treatment of 
diagnostic processes. This will result in a new extension 
ontology of the CPO, namely the Medical Cognitive Process 
Ontology (MCPO) and will allow us to introduce a new term 
for those diagnoses that should be trusted, which we shall 
henceforth refer to as ‘warranted diagnoses’. ‘Warrant’ is used 
here in the Plantingan sense (4) to mean roughly trustworthy 
because of how it was produced. This in turn will allow data 
about diagnoses to be tracked along a new and important 
dimension. 
Methods 
To show that [DP1] is insufficient to distinguish warranted from 
unwarranted diagnoses, we apply it to two clinical scenarios 
and observe the results in regards to warrant and luck. We then 
examine whether, by exploiting the principles of referent 
tracking, we can create a definition that will allow us to account 
for warrant and luck. 
Materials 
We input key terms from the Ontology of General Medical 
Sciences (OGMS) (5) and the term ‘representation’ from Smith 
and Ceusters (6). We also apply the principles of referent 
tracking as spelled out in (7–10).  
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Referent tracking (RT) is a strategy for organizing data that uses 
unambiguous names (for instance alphanumeric strings), called 
‘instance unique identifiers’, to refer to entities, i.e. particulars, 
in the world. In addition, RT provides a system for creating 
metadata to track different portions of reality (PORs) and the 
relations between them as the world changes. Importantly, we 
understand the world as including also the referent tracking 
system itself and the data that the system organizes. These data, 
too, can be assigned instance unique identifiers when needed. 
Of interest to us here is the way in which a referent tracking 
system (RTS) categorizes errors. (An RTS is an implementation 
of referent tracking.) Errors, too, are PORs, and so errors can 
be tracked. The question raised in this communication is 
whether tracking errors using an RTS can help us to categorize 
errors in a way that takes warrant into account. The types of 
errors we pay attention to are represented by specific error 
codes (listed in Tables 1 and 2 below), and we will use these to 
document our analysis. 
For the sake of continuity we use two scenarios from Hogan and 
Ceusters (1). Both scenarios involve the same patient, Mr. 
Jones. In each case, Mr. Jones has the disease type 2 diabetes 
mellitus. The cases differ in regard to who is the treating 
physician and whether that physician gave a correct diagnosis. 
The scenarios, and the details added thereto, are as follows. 
Scenario 1: Correct diagnosis by physician 
Dr. Anne Smith sees Mr. Jones in her office. She takes a history 
and physical, performs certain laboratory tests, and on the basis 
of her analysis of the findings, she correctly concludes that Mr. 
Jones has type 2 diabetes mellitus. She subsequently writes her 
diagnosis in the patient’s medical record. 
Scenario 2: Incorrect diagnosis by physician at a later time 
Mr. Jones is traveling on vacation, when he falls ill. He sees Dr. 
Jane Miller who does not have any of his past records available, 
and thus is not aware of the previous diagnoses made by Dr. 
Smith. Dr. Miller infers a new clinical picture of Mr. Jones, and 
incorrectly concludes on its basis that Mr. Jones has type 1 
diabetes mellitus. She accordingly records a diagnosis of type 1 
diabetes mellitus in her medical record for Mr. Jones. 
Details Added to the Scenarios 
Scenario 1: The laboratory testing performed by Dr. Smith is 
unknowingly completed using unreliable equipment. 
Scenario 2: The new clinical picture formed, and the subsequent 
diagnosis asserted, by Dr. Miller was the output of a type of 
diagnostic process that, according to peer review, is highly 
reliable at correctly diagnosing type 1 diabetes mellitus. The 
diagnostic process was carried out properly. 
Analysis 
Scenario 1: A lucky diagnosis 
A diagnostic process that depends on unreliable equipment 
cannot be trusted to produce a correct diagnosis. This is because 
the fidelity of a clinical picture of the sort used by Dr. Smith is 
subject to the reliability of the equipment used in testing. 
Unreliable equipment results in an unreliable clinical picture, 
and an unreliable clinical picture results in an unreliable 
diagnosis. (‘Reliable’ here means: has a high likelihood of 
being correct.) 
We have stipulated that Dr. Smith’s diagnosis was in fact 
correct; however its correctness is, because of the use of bad 
equipment, not the product of a procedure which is of a sort that 
has been vetted for use in the given environment. Furthermore, 
the fact that Dr. Smith was not aware that the equipment was 
unreliable changes nothing regarding the warrant of the 
diagnosis. The trustworthiness of a diagnosis is a function of 
the reliability of the process in the circumstance used to produce 
the diagnosis. Dr. Smith’s diagnosis fails to be warranted on the 
account we are here proposing. 
Scenario 2: An unlucky diagnosis 
Dr. Miller’s diagnosis is wrong. However, in order to diagnose 
Mr. Jones, she properly used, in an environment for which it 
was vetted, a peer reviewed and highly reliable diagnostic 
process. Thus, although Dr. Miller’s diagnosis is wrong, until 
the time she comes to believe that it is wrong, her diagnosis is 
warranted and should be trusted. This is because we should trust 
the outputs of highly reliable processes unless that output is 
reasonably called into question. 
Towards a Revision of the Definition of ‘Diagnostic Process’ 
[DP1] discriminates between diagnoses and non-diagnoses only 
on the grounds of whether or not the process inputs a clinical 
picture and an aggregate of representations (of at least one type 
of disease and at least one type of phenotype whose instances 
are associated with instances of that disease) and outputs an 
assertion to the effect that the patient has a disease of a certain 
type. Thus, the assertions in both scenarios qualify as 
diagnoses. The only difference between them, according to 
[DP1], is that Dr. Smith’s diagnosis is correct and Dr. Miller’s 
diagnosis is incorrect. 
This means that there is no discrimination along the dimensions 
of reliability or warrant. Incidentally, among the correct 
diagnoses Dr. Miller could have made is that Mr. Jones does 
not have type 1 diabetes. Though this appears to be a legitimate 
diagnosis, [DP1] does not allow it to be classified as such. It 
also does not allow disease course, disorder, or some 
combination of these (including combinations also involving 
disease) to be the subject of a diagnosis. 
Referent Tracking 
RT, too, did not until now have the resources to account for the 
distinction between warrant and luck. RT asks the following six 
questions in order to establish whether the author made a 
mistake when adding an assertion (such as ‘Mr. Jones has 
diabetes’) to an RTS: 
1. Does the POR represented by the assertion objectively 
exist? 
2. Is the represented POR objectively relevant? 
3. Does the author believe that the represented POR exists? 
4. Does the author believe that the POR represented by the 
assertion is relevant? 
5. Is the assertion in the RTS the assertion intended by the 
author to represent the POR? 
6. In what way does the assertion in the RTS refer? 
Note: an answer of ‘No’ to question’s 4 or 5 means the author 
believes the POR does not exist or is not relevant.)  
Answer configurations P+1 and A+1 through A+4 (Table 1) 
indicate no error, while all other configurations (Table 2) 
indicate some error in the RTS. 
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According to this strategy, Dr. Smith’s diagnostic assertion is 
without error and should receive a code of P+1 – indicating an 
answer of ‘Yes’ to questions 1 through 5 and an answer of 
‘successfully refers’ to answer 6. Dr. Miller’s diagnostic 
assertion would be considered with error and should receive a 
code of P-1, which indicates ‘Yes’ to questions 3-5 and ‘No’ to 
question 1, ‘not applicable’ to question 2, and ‘no referent’ to 
question 6. As for [DP1] so also for the error configurations in 
RT, the only discrimination allowed between Dr. Smith’s and 
Dr. Miller’s assertions is that Dr. Smith’s is correct and Dr. 
Miller’s incorrect. No further dimension of assessment is 
available. 
Table 1 – Referent Tracking Codes that Indicate No-Error  
‘P’ = ‘present’, ‘A’ = ‘absent’, ‘+’ = no error, ‘N/A’= ‘not 
applicable’, and ‘N/C’ = ‘not considered’ 
 Questions 
C
onfigurations 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
P+1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Refers 
Correctly 
A+1 No N/A No N/A N/A N/A 
A+2 Yes No Yes No N/A N/A 
A+3 Yes No N/C N/A N/A N/A 
A+4 No N/A N/C N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 3 – Key Terms from OGMS used in the Analysis 
Term with Definition / Elucidation 
Clinical Phenotype: A clinically abnormal phenotype (1). 
Clinical Picture: A representation of a clinical phenotype 
that is inferred from a combination of, for example, diagnoses 
and laboratory, image, and clinical findings about a given 
patient (1). 
Disease: A disposition (i) to undergo pathological processes 
that (ii) exists in an organism because of one or more 
disorders in that organism (5). 
Diagnostic Process [DP1]: An interpretive process that has 
as inputs 1) a clinical picture of a given patient 2) an aggregate 
of representations of 2a) at least one type of disease and 2b) 
at least one type of phenotype whose instances are associated 
with instances of that disease, and has as output 3) an 
assertion to the effect that the patient has a disease of a certain 
type (1). 
Diagnosis: A conclusion of an interpretive process that has as 
input a clinical picture of a given patient and as output an 
assertion to the effect that the patient has a disease of such 
and such a type (1). 
Disease Course: The totality of all processes through which 
a given disease instance is realized (5). 
Disorder: A causally relatively isolated combination of 
physical components that is (a) clinically abnormal and (b) 
maximal, in the sense that it is not a part of some larger such 
combination (5).   
Phenotype: A (combination of) bodily feature(s) of an 
organism determined by the interaction of its genetic make-
up and environment (5). 
Representation: A quality which is_about or is intended to 
be about a portion of reality (6). 
x is a Clinically Abnormal Phenotype: x is a non-canonical 
phenotype of an organism and x increases the organism’s risk 
of being harmed (5). 
x is a Portion of Reality: x exists or is a configuration of 
existents (6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Referent Tracking Codes that Indicate Error 
‘P’ = ‘present’, ‘A’ = ‘absent’, ‘+’ = no error, ‘N/A’= ‘not 
applicable’, ‘N/C’ = ‘not considered’, ‘Conf.’ = 
‘configuration’ 
Conf. Questions 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
P-1 No N/A Yes Yes Yes No Referent 
P-2 No N/A No N/A N/A No Referent 
P-3 No N/A Yes No N/A Refers 
Inaccurately 
P-4 Yes No N/C N/A N/A No Referent 
P-5 Yes N/A N/C N/A N/A No Referent 
P-6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Refers 
Correctly 
P-7 Yes No Yes Yes No No Referent 
P-8 Yes No Yes Yes No Refers 
Inaccurately 
P-9 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Redundant 
Reference 
P-10 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Redundant 
Reference 
P-11 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Ambiguous 
Reference 
P-12 No N/A Yes Yes Yes Ambiguous 
Reference 
A-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
A-2 Yes Yes No N/A N/A N/A 
A-3 No N/A Yes No N/A N/A 
A-4 Yes No No N/A N/A N/A 
A-5 Yes Yes N/C N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 4 – ‘BE’ means ‘Believes Exists’, ‘BR’ means ‘Believes 
is Relevant’ 
Believes 
Exists 
Believes 
Relevant 
Warranted 
BE 
Warranted 
BR 
Warrant 
Code 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes w2 
Yes No w1-2 
No No w0 
No N/A Yes N/A w1 No N/A w0 
Yes No 
Yes Yes w0 
Yes No w1-2 
No No w0 
N/C N/A N/A N/A wna 
 
Results 
The result of our analysis is that a notion of ‘warrant’ is 
required, both in OGMS and in RT, to discriminate between 
diagnoses that are warranted and those that are merely lucky. 
To this end we import into OGMS the term ‘warranted 
assertion’ from CPO, along with the required dependencies. 
This allows us to define ‘warranted diagnosis’ and ‘proper 
diagnostic functioning’ (See Table 5). This introduces a 
normative aspect to the treatment of both ‘diagnosis’ and 
‘diagnostic process’. These new terms now belong to both CPO 
and the Medical Cognitive Process Ontology (MCPO). 
The definition of ‘diagnostic process’ also needs to be revised 
to allow both for negative diagnoses and for those cases where 
the output of a diagnostic process involves a representation of a 
disorder, disease course, or some combination of these 
(including combinations involving disease).  
To add warrant to RT, we import the CPO term ‘representation 
that is believed’ (RTB) and its subclass ‘representation that is 
warranted’ (RTW). This allows us to add an additional question 
to RT’s error-checking questionnaire: “Is what the author 
believes about the existence and relevance of portions of reality 
warranted?” 
The answer to this additional question depends on questions 3 
and 4, both which ask what the author believes. Warrant is only 
applicable when there is a representation that is believed (RTB) 
to apply warrant to. And when warrant is applied, this makes 
the representation a representation that is warranted (RTW). 
Note that just because warrant is applied this does not mean that 
the RTB is actually warranted only that it has been assessed as 
such. Furthermore, it is probable that not all truly warranted 
RTBs will be tagged as warranted. There is room for error in 
the application of warrant and in the determination of whether 
warrant has been applied at all. 
Additionally, in all cases, if the RTB of “Believes POR exists?” 
(question 3) is unwarranted – that is, if it is not an RTW – then 
the RTB of “Believes POR relevant?” (question 4) is also 
unwarranted. This is because a positive answer to “Believes 
POR exists?” is required for an RTB about that POR’s 
relevance to be warranted. I cannot be warranted in believing 
that the Jabberwocky is relevant without also believing that the 
Jabberwocky exists. Finally, if answers to question 3 or 4 are 
not considered or not applicable, then warrant is not applicable 
to those answers either. 
The representation of warrant in an RTS takes the following 
forms (see also Table 4): 
1. ‘w1’ the author’s RTB about a POR’s existence is 
warranted and warrant is not applicable to the author’s 
RTB about the POR’s relevance. 
2. ‘w1-2’ the author’s RTB about a POR’s existence is 
warranted but what the author believes about the POR’s 
relevance is unwarranted. 
3. ‘w2’ the author’s RTBs about a POR’s existence and 
relevance are both warranted. 
4. ‘w0’ the author’s RTB about a POR’s existence is 
unwarranted and warrant is not applicable to the author’s 
RTB about the POR’s relevance. 
5. ‘wna’ warrant is not applicable to the author’s RTBs about 
the existence or relevance of a POR. 
The codes are intended to be appended to the current RT error 
codes; for instance ‘P+1w2’ would indicate: an answer of ‘yes’ 
to every question, that all assertions refer correctly, and that 
both RTBs are warranted.  
Discussion 
Revising the definition of ‘Diagnostic Process’ 
[DP1] needs to be revised, first, so that it will refer not simply 
to diagnostic assertions about a patient’s having a certain 
disease, but rather to the patient’s either having a certain 
disease, or participating in a certain disease course, or having a 
certain disorder, or having none, some, or all of these.  
These additions are important because it may be, for example, 
that a patient is first diagnosed as participating in a disease 
course, for instance manifesting cortisol deficiency. The latter 
might then be a realization of a number of different diseases and 
is only later diagnosed as a case of the specific disease of 
congenital adrenal insufficiency. The assertion that the patient 
has cortisol deficiency is no less a diagnosis than is the 
assertation that the patient has congenital adrenal insufficiency, 
even though only the latter refers to a disease. Each of these 
assertions can be arrived at through a combination of a clinical 
picture and an aggregate of relevant representations; each is a 
proper subject of medical concern; and each calls for a 
treatment plan. The same can be said generally of disease, 
disease course, disorder, and any and all combinations of these. 
Each is what, for convenience in this paper, we shall call a 
‘condition’ (compare (11,12)). Each is properly asserted during 
or as an output of a diagnostic process, as something had by a 
patient. (Note that ‘had’, here, is shorthand for either ‘has a part 
that participates in’ (in the case of a disease course), ‘has a part 
that has part’ (in case of a disorder), or ‘has a part that bears’ 
(in other cases).) There are successful diagnoses and there are 
failed diagnoses. The family of successful diagnoses includes 
assertions of the form ‘has condition’; however, it also includes 
assertion of the form ‘has no condition’ (or ‘is healthy’) (13). A 
diagnostic process is an investigative process – an inquiry – into 
the health of a patient and as long as that inquiry concludes with 
an assertion of one or other of the forms ‘has condition’ or ‘has 
no condition,’ then the goals of the inquiry are met.  
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This allows for ordinary diagnostic practices like asserting that 
a person is cancer free after treatment. An example of a failed 
diagnostic process would be a concluding assertion such as: 
‘inconclusive regarding the presence of a condition’. (We leave 
open here the question of how specific a diagnostic assertion 
must be to qualify as a diagnosis.) 
To apply these improvements to the definition of ‘diagnostic 
process’ we replace the (undefined) term ‘interpretative 
process’ with the term ‘investigative process’ from CPO, which 
represents a subclass of what the Mental Functioning Ontology 
(MF) terms a ‘cognitive process’: 
Table 5 – Terms from CPO with draft definitions, together with MCPO to be integrated with OGMS 
Term Definition  
Assertion An information quality entity that is the concretization of a descriptive information content entity 
(CPO). 
Clinical Picture that is 
Warranted 
A clinical picture that is a representation that is warranted (MCPO. 
Cognitive Process A mental process that creates, modifies or has as participant some cognitive representation (CPO). 
Cognitive System A system all of whose parts are also parts of a single organism and which realizes mental dispositions 
(CPO). 
Cognitive Representation A mental representation that has a mind-to-world direction of fit (CPO). 
Confidence Value A mental quality that, when fused with a cognitive representation CR, determines the extent to which 
a cognitive system operates as if CR is actually veridical (CPO). 
Descriptive Information 
Content Entity 
An information content entity that describes some portion of reality. 
Diagnostic Process 
(Revised) [DP2] 
An investigative process that has as inputs: 1) a clinical picture of a given patient, 2) an aggregate 
of representations of 2a) at least one type of disease, disease course, or disorder and 2b) at least one 
type of phenotype whose instances are associated with instances of that disease, disease course, 
disorder, or combination thereof, and has as output(3) an assertion based on 1) and 2) to the effect 
that the patient does or does not have a disease, disease course, disorder, or combination thereof of 
a certain type (MCPO). 
Information Quality Entity A quality that is the concretization of some information content entity (6). 
Investigative Process A cognitive process whose agent intends to establish or confirm that some portion of reality exists 
or does not exist (CPO). 
Mental Quality A quality which specifically depends on an anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an 
organism and is experiential (compare with (6)) (CPO). 
Mental Representation A representation which is a mental quality (6). 
Process of Proper 
Cognitive Functioning 
A process of cognitive functioning that has been successfully vetted or designed to reliably form 
veridical cognitive representations in some type of environment(s) (CPO). 
Processes of Proper 
Diagnostic Functioning 
An investigative process that inputs representations that are warranted, including a clinical picture 
that is warranted, and, based on these inputs, outputs a warranted assertion to the effect that the 
patient does or does not have a disease, disease progression, disorder, or combination thereof of a 
certain type (MCPO). 
Representation that is 
Believed 
A cognitive representation that is fused with a positive confidence value (CPO). 
Representation that is 
Warranted 
A representation that is believed that is formed through proper cognitive functioning in a vetted- or 
designed-for environment (CPO). 
System A material entity including as parts multiple objects that are causally integrated (16). 
Warranted Assertion An assertion that is based on a representation that is warranted (CPO). 
Warranted Diagnosis A warranted assertion to the effect that the patient does or does not have a disease, disease 
progression, disorder, or combination thereof of a certain type and that is the output of proper 
diagnostic functioning (MCPO). 
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Cognitive Process =def. A mental process that creates, 
modifies or has as participant some cognitive representation 
(MF, CPO). 
Investigative Process =def. A cognitive process whose agent 
intends to establish or confirm that some portion of reality 
exists or does not exist (CPO). 
An investigative process can be as simple as glancing upwards 
to confirm the position of the hands of a clock and as complex 
as an international terrorist hunt.  
Putting the above together, ‘diagnostic process’ can now be 
defined as follows: 
Diagnostic Process [DP2] =def. an investigative process that 
has as inputs: 1) a clinical picture of a given patient, 2) an 
aggregate of representations of 2a) at least one type of 
disease, disease course, or disorder and 2b) at least one type 
of phenotype whose instances are associated with instances 
of that disease, disease course, disorder, or combination 
thereof, and has as output 3) an assertion based on 1) and 2) 
to the effect that the patient does or does not have a disease, 
disease course, disorder, or combination thereof of a 
certain type. (Revisions are in bold) 
A diagnostic process is aimed at establishing or confirming the 
presence of a condition in a patient. Investigations unfold as an 
agent follows indicators, which are portions of reality that 
affect that agent’s estimation that some other portion of reality 
exists. Practically anything (real) can be a portion of reality. So 
not only are universals and instances portions of reality (and 
potential indicators), but so also are combinations of these, such 
as a patient in Tucson, Arizona having a stage four carcinoma 
in his lung at 12pm MST on October 12, 1972 (14). A clinical 
picture, because of what it represents, is the key type of 
indicator for clinical diagnostics.  
Mental Representation 
Our task here and onward is to examine the systems in which 
warrant plays a role, and specifically to explore the types of 
cognitive processes which provide its substrate. 
‘Mental quality’ is a key term in the CPO and is a subclass of 
BFO:quality (15). ‘x is a Mental Quality’ means, provisionally, 
that 1) x is a quality which specifically depends on an 
anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an organism 
(compare with (6)) and 2) x is, for lack of a better word, 
experiential. The term ‘experiential’ is meant to distinguish 
mental qualities from other qualities that inhere in an 
anatomical structure in a cognitive system, like the shape of 
Broca’s area. We remain agnostic as to what a mental quality’s 
physical basis might be, that is, what sort of independent 
continuant it inheres in. 
Mental qualities are either representational or they are not. Non-
representational mental qualities include those that are 
responsible for giving emotional and sensational processes their 
characteristic feel. For example, the process of experiencing 
pain hurts because of the mental qualities involved in that 
process, and similarly for experiences of sorrow or joy.  
In formulating the above elucidation, we are agnostic as to 
which parts of an organism constitute its cognitive system. We 
do however assume that it includes parts of the brain. The term 
‘structure’ should also be understood in a very general sense, 
including for instance areas of the brain with particularly dense 
neuronal connections specialized to specific sorts of mental 
functioning. Broca’s area is a structure in this broad sense.  
System =def. A system is a material entity including as parts 
multiple objects that are causally integrated (16).  
Cognitive System =def. A system all of whose parts are also 
parts of a single organism and which realizes mental 
dispositions (CPO). 
The definitions of ‘system’ and ‘cognitive system’ presented 
here are also provisional, and should be read in conjunction 
with the proposed definition of ‘bodily system’ found in (17).  
Aboutness 
Some mental qualities are representations defined as follows:  
Representation =def. A quality which is about, or is intended 
to be about, a portion of reality (6). 
Mental Representation =def. A representation which is a 
mental quality (6). 
Mental representations are responsible for the intentionality 
(directedness or aboutness) found in a cognitive process 
(henceforth just ‘about’ or ‘aboutness’). When asked, “What 
are you thinking about?” the answer is dependent on your 
mental representations. We address ‘is about’ first and then 
discuss ‘intended to be about’.  
Is About 
For the purpose of this discussion we distinguish two kinds of 
entities that have aboutness: mental representations and 
information content entities (ICEs).  
ICEs are BFO:generically dependent continuants (GDCs), 
which means that an instance of an ICE can have multiple 
concretizations (15). For example, the particular instance of an 
ICE that is Grey’s Anatomy – also an instance of the subtype 
textbook – not only exists as concretized by the pattern of 
qualities inhering in the physical book (made of ink, glue, and 
paper) on your shelf, but also in the physical books on the shelf 
in the library and at the bookstore. It also exists as concretized 
by the electromagnetic patterns that form the pdf file in your 
laptop. Grey’s Anatomy is concretized in each case (they are all 
distinct copies of the same textbook). It is concretized by 
distinct instances of complex quality patterns inhering in 
different individual books or digital files. Grey’s Anatomy then 
depends generically on each and every book (or file) that 
concretizes it, and each and every book (or file) would have to 
be destroyed to successfully destroy Grey’s Anatomy itself. 
Mental representations, in contrast to ICEs, are BFO: 
specifically dependent continuants. Thus, an instance of a 
mental representation specifically depends on part of a 
cognitive system and is only located where its bearer is located.  
Two Types of Aboutness 
We distinguish two types of aboutness: original and derived 
(18). This distinction mirrors that between bona fide and fiat 
boundaries; both types of boundaries exist and are genuine, but 
the former are associated with ‘natural demarcations’, such as 
walls and rivers, while the latter only come into existence 
through the intentional actions of agents such as the signing of 
a legal document that specifies a property line (19). Even fiat 
property lines are then parts of reality, and have legal 
significance.  
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Entities with Original Aboutness 
Entities that have original aboutness are various types of mental 
representations, qualities of parts of a cognitive system that are 
about this or that, for example when I see an apple before me. 
The aboutness here is original because, like bona fide 
boundaries, the is_about relation between a mental 
representation and its referent is not derived from the intentions 
of agents in any way analogous to the way in which fiat 
boundaries come into existence. We suspect there is no original 
aboutness outside of mental representations. 
Entities with Derived Aboutness 
Entities with derived aboutness are ICEs concretized in 
symbols (quality-patterns) such as ‘dog’ or ‘π’, either spoken, 
written, or otherwise instantiated (for example on a memory 
stick). Symbols have their ICEs imparted upon them by the 
intentionality of agents. Thus, it was only after an act of naming 
that ‘π’ became one way of expressing the ICE otherwise 
expressed as ‘pi’. Following Chisholm’s doctrine of the 
primacy of the mental, the derived aboutness of an ICE, is 
explained in terms of some original aboutness (20). The reason 
why the ink or pixel pattern ‘π’ is associated with the ICE “the 
ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter” is, first, 
because of the original aboutness in the mind of  William Jones, 
who first introduced that symbol to carry this  ICE, and, later, 
because of the original aboutness in the minds of nearly every 
student who learned the language of mathematics. Derived 
aboutness thus obtains for every ‘π’ appearing in books about 
geometry on library shelves. In the cases treated by Chisholm, 
original aboutness always precedes derived aboutness. We 
reserve for later a discussion of cases, like automated 
surveillance, where the temporal ordering is reversed.  
Merely Intended To Be About 
Representations can exist without an aboutness relation (6,21). 
For example, the symbol (pattern of ink or pixels) ‘π’ would 
still exist even without an aboutness relation in a world in which 
the pattern was never associated with any ICE. And similarly, 
mental representations can also exist without an aboutness 
relation. While there is no miasma, there are mental 
representations in the minds of some medical historians that are 
suited to be about miasma. These mental representations would 
be about miasma were such an entity to exist.   
Though a mental representation can fail to have an aboutness, 
mental representations are always intended to be about 
something. This primitive notion ‘intended to be about’ 
describes a suitedness to be about something or other. A mental 
representation can be suited to be about x and at the same time 
fail to be about x because x does not exist. As an analogy, a key 
is suited to open a particular type of lock, but that does not 
imply that the key is ever used to open such a lock nor even that 
instances of locks, of the type that the key is suited to open, do 
in fact exist. 
Cognitive Representation 
‘Cognitive representation’ is a subtype of ‘mental 
representation’. The distinguishing feature of a cognitive 
representation is what Searle called its ‘mind-to-world direction 
of fit’ (22,23). Cognitive representations can be more or less 
accurate. If a cognitive representation is inaccurate, then the 
error is in the cognitive representation and not elsewhere; the 
cognitive representation aims to fit what it is intended to be 
about in the world and not vice versa. ‘x is a Cognitive 
Representation’ means x is a mental representation that has a 
mind-to-world direction of fit (CPO). 
Contrast this with a type of mental representation that would be 
associated with a desire; a desire demands that the world fit it 
and not vice versa; it has a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Veridicality 
A distinction should be drawn between a representation’s being 
correct and its degree of correctness. A representation is correct 
(henceforth; ‘veridical’) when it is about the portion of reality 
that it is intended to be about (6). This is not the same as only 
the representation’s constituent representational units being 
about what they are intended to be about (6). Take for example 
a cognitive representation CR1 “Samuel Albert is in my living 
room.” CR1 has some degree of accuracy because “Samuel 
Albert” successfully refers to Samuel Albert and “my living 
room” successfully refers to my living room – fulfilling the 
cognitive representation’s implication that each exists. 
However, CR1 is not veridical because Samuel Albert and my 
living room aren’t in the right configuration because Samuel 
Albert is not actually in my living room. To be veridical is not 
a matter of accuracy simpliciter but rather only of accuracy to 
the degree of detail that is appropriate given the level of 
granularity of the representation in question (24). When I assay 
the color of my wallpaper, I do not concern myself with the 
molecules on its surface. 
Representation that is Believed 
Some cognitive representations are taken by the agent to be 
veridical. These are what we referred to above with the term 
‘representation that is believed’ (RTB). 
An RTB is treated by the agent (or by his cognitive system) as 
being actually true, even though it may not in fact be actually 
true. More specifically, what distinguishes an RTB from a mere 
cognitive representation is that the latter is fused with a positive 
confidence value (Compare what Meinong has to say about 
Ernstgefühle or, more generally, about serious (or earnest) 
mental phenomena in (25).)  
‘Fusion’ is a term adapted from Husserl (26) (who in turn takes 
it from Stumpf (27)) and is a primitive relationship that obtains 
between multiple quality instances when they are so closely 
related that an additional quality instance seems to emerge from 
them. 
Take for example what appears to be a solid green image 
displayed on a television screen, which upon very close 
inspection is revealed to have a color made out of tiny yellow 
and blue squares (or pixels), which give a green appearance to 
the naked eye. The pixels are bearers of many instances of 
yellow and blue, and these instances appear to have fused into 
an additional instance of greenness. Similarly, when an instance 
of a cognitive representation and an instance of positive 
confidence value are fused together in a cognitive system there 
seems to be an additional quality instance: an instance of an 
RTB.  
A confidence value is a non-representational mental quality 
that, when fused with a cognitive representation, determines 
how that cognitive representation is utilized by a cognitive 
system. The result is that the cognitive system operates with that 
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cognitive representation as if it is veridical. If cognitive 
representation CR2 – that “My coffee is still too hot to drink” – 
is fused with a positive confidence value, then CR2 might be 
taken as input by the agent’s cognitive system when making a 
decision as to when to take a sip of the coffee. 
Importantly, a fused confidence value should not be confused 
with second-order cognitive representations, such as a 
representation about the likelihood of another representation’s 
being veridical (as for example when you are asked: “Are you 
sure?”). Such second-order mental representations are distinct 
from the pre-introspective and non-representational confidence 
that we find fused with those cognitive representations which 
are RTBs. Here a second-order mental representation is an 
evaluation of the confidence value fused with a mental 
representation. We leave the full explication of this distinction 
for future work. 
Confidence Value =def. A mental quality that, when fused 
with a cognitive representation CR, determines the extent to 
which a cognitive system operates as if CR is veridical 
(CPO). 
With this in mind we can now define ‘representation that is 
believed’ as follows:  
Representation that is Believed (RTB) =def. A cognitive 
representation that is fused with a positive confidence value 
(CPO). 
Representation that is Warranted 
Following Plantinga (4), a representation that is warranted 
(RTW) is an RTB which holds an epistemically privileged place 
in a cognitive system because it was produced by some 
designed or vetted process so that, when in an environment of 
the sort that it was designed or vetted for, it reliably outputs 
veridical cognitive representations. As such, the produced RTB 
is not just de facto fused with a positive confidence but also is 
such that it should be fused with a positive confidence. 
Instances of such processes are instances of ‘proper cognitive 
functioning’, and the cognitive representations formed by such 
processes are warranted: 
Process of Proper Cognitive Functioning =def.  A cognitive 
process that has been successfully vetted or designed to 
reliably form veridical cognitive representations in 
environments of given types (CPO). 
Representation that is Warranted (RTW) =def. A 
Representation that is Believed formed through proper 
cognitive functioning in a vetted- or designed-for 
environment (CPO). 
The privilege of an RTW is not that it is in every case correct. 
(“Reliably” does not imply: in every case.) Rather it is that it 
can justifiably be used in a cognitive process without further 
scrutiny. 
Expanding on Warrant 
A paradigm example of an RTW is one formed on the basis of 
sense perception when in the appropriate environment (for 
instance in an otherwise quiet room with good acoustics for 
hearing, or a clean palate for tasting). Consider the following: 
if you perceive that a ball is red while in a well-lit room standing 
in close proximity to the ball, then a cognitive representation 
that “The ball is red” formed on the basis of this experience is 
warranted and can be used without further scrutiny to form 
other cognitive representations, like “The ball is my favorite 
color.”  
It is assumed that the neurocognitive structures underlying 
normal perceptual processes – such as processes of forming a 
representation that the ball is red based on seeing that the ball 
is red – were in a sense vetted in the course of evolution. The 
ability to form representations that are believed based on 
encounters with external reality was part of what kept our 
ancestors alive and able to reproduce.  
Domain Specific Warrant 
Evolution is not the only way in which processes come to be 
vetted, however. There are other classes of vetted cognitive 
processes associated with domains of inquiry involved, for 
example, in predictive maintenance, medicine, and intelligence 
analysis. For example, an RTB about how much oil is left in an 
engine, formed on the basis of the perceptual/kinesthetic 
experience of a properly used dipstick, should be assumed to be 
veridical; as should a cognitive representation formed on the 
basis of a document about the results of a blood panel provided 
by an experienced laboratory technician. Furthermore, a 
process of intelligence gathering that relies on signals from an 
array of active and passive sensors to locate a satellite can also 
produce, in the minds of suitably qualified analysts, 
representations that are warranted. 
Warrant in Medicine 
In medicine, a process of proper cognitive functioning is 
designed and then vetted through peer review and empirical 
testing. For example, Marzolf et al. (28) describes a procedure 
using the Spot Vision Screener to screen for ophthalmological 
pathology. This procedure had already been vetted for certain 
pediatric cases (29), but it is there further vetted for cases where 
the patient is a child with developmental disabilities.  
How reliable a process must be at producing veridical cognitive 
representations so as to be considered a process of proper 
cognitive functioning is in part a matter for peer review. The 
notion of ‘can be reasonably used without scrutiny’ which is at 
the heart of warrant will differ from field to field and, at least to 
some extent, be related to the question of when a cognitive 
representation is actionable. Whether or not a cognitive 
representation is actionable is determined on the basis of the 
general goals of experts in the associated field. In medicine the 
relevant cognitive representations are in many case not first-
order representations (such as “The patient has condition x”) but 
second-order representations (“There is a 0.6 likelihood that the 
assertion ‘the patient has condition x’ is veridical”). If a medical 
provider is unwarranted in regards to the first cognitive 
representation but warranted in regards to the second, then, 
depending on factors such as the severity of condition x and the 
cost of treatment, the medical provider should recommend that 
treatment begin. She will do so, for instance, when the condition 
is elevated risk of stroke, say from silent atrial fibrillation (30), 
and the treatment is a daily regimen of aspirin (31). 
The Relationship Between Warrant and Veridicality 
Not all veridical cognitive representations are warranted. 
Sometimes we get lucky. Here is an example. Taking a patient’s 
temperature is an instance of proper cognitive functioning; it is 
a successfully designed and vetted process that is reliable at 
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forming veridical cognitive representations when in the right 
environment. Part of being in the right environment includes 
using a properly calibrated thermometer.  
Importantly, cognitive representations that are warranted are 
not always veridical. As we saw in part one, a provider who 
exercises proper cognitive functioning to screen for a condition 
will obviously still sometimes form non-veridical cognitive 
representations that are warranted (32). Though proper 
cognitive functioning is reliable (in the vetted- or designed-for 
environment) it is not infallible. Even if a process of proper 
cognitive functioning were to identify a condition with 0.99999 
reliability there would still be room for error.  
Warrant and Proper Diagnostic Functioning 
A clinician must assert her findings to create a diagnosis. An 
assertion is not a cognitive representation.  
Assertion =def. An information quality entity that is the 
concretization of a descriptive information content entity 
that is expressible by means of a sentence (CPO). 
An information quality entity may be a check mark in a medical 
form on paper or on a screen.  Or it may be an entire clinical 
note. ‘x is a Descriptive Information Content entity’ means x is 
an information content entity that describes some portion of 
reality. 
As such, diagnoses cannot be formed through proper cognitive 
functioning: only the cognitive representations that diagnoses 
are based on can be.  
Warranted Assertion 
A diagnosis is an assertion that is the output of a diagnostic 
process. An assertion inherits the same warrant status as the 
cognitive representation it is based on. (By ‘based on’, here, we 
mean the relationship that holds between a mental 
representation and an assertion during a normal act of 
communication.) As such, if a cognitive representation is 
warranted, then an assertion based on that cognitive 
representation is warranted also. This provides us with a notion 
of ‘warranted assertion’: 
Warranted Assertion =def. An assertion that is based on a 
representation that is warranted. 
The importance of warranted assertions cannot be understated. 
They are the means by which we form cognitive representations 
about entities that we can only learn about through 
communicating with others; for example, it is through a 
warranted assertion that a patient forms a cognitive 
representation about her own diagnosis. It is also likely the 
means by which you know where you were born. 
Warranted Clinical Picture 
Furthermore, an instance of an RTW that qualifies as a clinical 
picture can be termed a ‘clinical picture that is warranted’. 
Clinical Picture that is Warranted =def. A clinical picture 
that is a Representation that is Warranted (MCPO). 
An instance of a ‘clinical picture that is warranted’ should be 
assumed as veridical in a diagnostic process. 
Proper Diagnostic Functioning 
We can use ‘warranted assertion’ and ‘clinical picture that is 
warranted’ to build the following definition of ‘proper 
diagnostic functioning’: 
Proper Diagnostic Functioning =def. A diagnostic process 
that inputs representations that are warranted, including a 
clinical picture that is warranted, and, based on these inputs, 
outputs a warranted assertion to the effect that the patient 
does or does not have a disease, disease progression, 
disorder, or combination thereof of a certain type (MCPO). 
Warranted Diagnosis 
This allows us to define ‘warranted diagnosis’: 
Warranted Diagnosis =def. A warranted assertion to the 
effect that the patient does or does not have a disease, 
disease progression, disorder, or combination thereof of a 
certain type and that is the output of proper diagnostic 
functioning (MCPO). 
Future Work and Limitations 
Creating definitions that allow data about the reliability of 
medical processes and diagnoses to be tracked paves the way 
for more and we believe better research about, among other 
things, patient safety. Warrant provides both a new dimension 
along which to collect data about patient safety and a direction 
to pursue in the forming of metrics for the quality of patient 
care. 
That being said, the applications of warrant, especially in 
medicine, may be limited because of the uncontrolled 
environments that many medical processes unfold in. Without 
a controlled environment it is difficult to vet a process for a 
specific circumstance. This is something that is easier to 
achieve, for example, in an area like industrial design (where 
prototypes can be tested) than in medicine. Thus, it is still 
unclear how warrant would be applied in many clinical 
scenarios. 
There are however clear applications for warrant in any field 
that relies on investigative processes to achieve goals. 
Intelligence, forensics, finance, and predictive maintenance are 
all areas where it is important to distinguish a warranted 
assertion from mere luck. We expect research on warrant to 
continue to be pursued in these fields in addition to being 
further developed for medicine. 
Conclusion 
The addition of MCPO to OGMS allows for warrant and luck 
to be distinguished, both in terms of diagnoses and in referent 
tracking. Scenarios hitherto distinguishable only by the 
veridicality of their diagnoses can now be distinguished in 
terms of whether each doctor’s assertion was or was not 
warranted. It is also now possible to track data in an RTS, not 
only in terms of its fidelity, but also in terms of whether or not 
an assertion should be (or should have been) trusted.  
CPO itself is a new addition to the growing suite of ontologies 
that are compliant with Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). It 
represents the kinds of mental processes that are relevant to acts 
of reasoning, analysis, and investigation as they occur not only 
in medicine but also in other areas. It thus has applications to 
science in general, to intelligence analysis, finance, forensics, 
industrial design, preventive maintenance, software debugging, 
and many more (33). We believe that it will have applications 
also in Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, specifically in 
relation to the problem of what is called “Explainable AI”, by 
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providing a vehicle for incorporating explanation-related data 
into the training sets used for machine learning (34).  
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